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Trading at Divorce:
Preferences, Legal Rules and Transactions Costs
MARGARET F. BRINIG AND MICHAEL V. ALEXEEV*
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost ten years, legal commentators have been aware of the
possibility of applying economic bargaining principles to the problems of
negotiations at the time of divorce.! Although some cases and journal
articles have mentioned the Mnookin and Komhauser article suggesting
that custodial time and financial assets might be exchanged, 2 attempts to
apply the analysis have been confined to description. No one has
attempted an empirical study to see if there really are trade-offs between
custodial time and marital assets at the time of divorce, and there has been
no formal model describing the process.'
Furthermore, there has been no analytical discussion of what
happens when the legal rules change,4 either in terms of the outcomes of
bargaining or in terms of the transaction costs of the process. On the
other hand, there has been much attention devoted to the plight of single
* Professor of Law, George Mason University, Associate Professor of Economics,
University of Indiana at Bloomington, respectively. The authors gratefully acknowledge the
research support of the Sarah Scaife Foundation, and the thoughtful comments from Lewis
Kornhauser, James Leitzel, Timothy Muris and Jenny Wahl, as well as participants in the
Law and Economics Workshop, George Mason University. Research assistance was provided
by Laurie LaCorte and Barboura Raisley.
I. See, e.g., Robert Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981); Jon Elster, Solomonic
Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5 (1987); Jerry
McCant, The Cultural Contradiction of Fathers as Nonparents, 21 FAM. L.Q. 127, 137
(1987); Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455
(1984).
3. There have been formal models describing the difference between bilateral and
unilateral no-fault divorce, see Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational
Constraints and Private Contracts, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986); and, more recently,
Douglas Allen, Marriage and Divorce: A Comment, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 479 (1992); and
pretrial strategic behavior including divorce cases, see Robert Cooter, et al., Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 225
(1982).
4. This is in the style of Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
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women with children in the era of no-fault divorce.'
This paper will attempt to fill the gap in the existing literature by
examining the bargaining process that resolves the issues involved in
divorce in the overwhelming majority of cases.6 It will investigate the
jurisprudential consequences of such a system in terms of "result" versus
"rule equality,"' and will discuss the effects of changes in the law on the
resulting allocations as well as on the extent that the parties use the court
system. The authors' results suggest that an unusually great variety of
settlement outcomes is possible, depending upon the preferences of
husbands and wives. In particular, we explain the apparent absence of the
exchanges of custody for shares of marital property in many cases. In
addition, we show that changes in rules regarding grounds for divorce,
alimony, property and child custody affect not only the results reached,
but also affect, to a greater extent, the procedures and transaction costs
involved in reaching them.
There is undoubtedly a significant amount of bargaining between
the divorcing spouses that occurs before legal proceedings! In fact, the
legal agreement that becomes a court decree is nearly always merely a
ratification of the settlement reached by the spouses.9 This bargaining is
affected by the existing legal statutes and precedents.1" The spouses'
expectations about the likely result if the judge intervenes provide the
alternative to continuing to bargain for a better outcome." Further, this
likely legal alternative, defined by state statutes and the less precise
5. See, e.g., Lenore Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic
Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181
(1981); Heather Wishik, The Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 J. FAM. L.
79 (1986); Robert McGraw, et al., A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and its Aftermath,
20 J. FAM. L. 443 (1981-82); Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No Fault
Divorce Law, 20 CAL. L. REv. 299 (1987).
6. Cooter, et al., supra note 3, at 243-44; McCant, supra note 2, at 137.
7. Martha Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change:
A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983
Wis. L. REv. 789, 791 (1983).
8. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1; John Murray, Improving Parent-Child
Relationships within the Divorced Family; A Call for Legal Reform, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
563, 588 (1986); Marygold Melli, et al., The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory
Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 Wis. L. REV. 1133, 1142 (1988).
9. Robert Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH.
J. L. REF. 1015, 1016 (1986); Melli, et al., supra note 8, at 1142.
10. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 1024; Mnookin, supra note 9.
11. Murray, supra note 8, at 588; Cooter, et al., supra note 3; ROGER FISHER AND
ROGER URY, GETrING TO YES (1985) (Fisher and Ury call this the BATNA or Best
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement).
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information about local judicial practices, serves as a benchmark which
each spouse uses to determine the extent of his/her concessions to the
other spouse.2
For these reasons, the outcome of the bargaining between the
spouses depends on the divorce laws of the particular state as well as what
the spouses want, or their partners think they want.' For settlement
purposes, there are four very significant legal variables. The first is the
statutory preference for child custody arrangements. Most states currently
provide either for "joint custody,"14 or they have a presumption that the
"primary caretaker" before separation, usually the mother, is the best
custodian following divorce.' The second involves grounds for divorce.
States have either a fault and no-fault combination16 or no-fault alone.
The third is the prevailing rationale for alimony (support of a dependent
former spouse17 or temporary payments for rehabilitative purposes).1
12. Elster, supra note 2, at 33; Murray, supra note 8, at 589.
13. Mnookin, supra note 9, at 1025-26.
14. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (1992), defining joint custody as either (i)
joint legal custody where both parents retain joint responsibility for the care and control of
the child and joint authority to make decisions concerning the child even though the child's
primary residence may be with only one parent, or (ii) joint physical custody where both
parents share physical and custodial care of the child, or (iii) any combination of joint legal
and joint physical custody which the court deems to be in the best interest of the child.
15. For favorable comments involving the primary caretaker presumption, see Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981); Robert Cochran, The Search for Guidance in
Determining the Best Interests of the Child at Divorce, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1985);
Elster, supra note 2, at 11; David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody
Disputes in Divorce, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 477, 493 (1984). A less favorable evaluation
appears in Elizabeth Scott's Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 615 (1992). The statutory language is almost invariably couched in terms of "the best
interests of the child."
16. An example of this is Virginia's divorce statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (1992),
which provides for divorces based on the fault grounds of adultery, cruelty, desertion,
imprisonment and confinement for a felony, and the no-fault ground of living separate and
apart for six months (no children, property settlement agreement) or one year (children, with
property settlement agreement). Wisconsin's divorce statute provides simply for dissolution
based upon irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.17 (West
1989-90).
17. See, e.g., Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 338, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940), quoted
favorably in Newport v. Newport, 219 Va. 48, 245 S.E.2d 134 (1978): "It stems from the
common-law right of the wife to support by her husband, which right, unless the wife by her
own misconduct forfeits it, continues to exist even after they cease to live together."
18. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26 (West 1989-90), providing for maintenance
for a limited or indefinite length of time after considering, among other things, the "time and
expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find
appropriate employment."
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Finally, but of no less significance, is the property regime, which at
divorce may be equitable distribution19 or the division of community
property."
In this paper, we will investigate the issues posed by bargaining at
divorce both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical discussion
applies the model of F.Y. Edgeworth2 to illustrate the bargaining in
Wisconsin, a state where the court outcomes are determinate.'
Following this, the effect of the uncertainty of litigated outcomes is
discussed in the context of Virginia marital settlements. The contrasting
approaches are followed by a discussion of the effect on transaction costs
as legal rules vary from the parties' desired outcomes. Both parts of the
theoretical model are illustrated by an empirical study of divorce cases in
two jurisdictions.
II. THE DATA
The data for statistical testing of the theoretical propositions come
from Fairfax County in Virginia (where more than 4500 cases were
analyzed) and Waukesha County in Wisconsin (where more than 3500
cases were analyzed).' The two counties are both suburban communities
that belong to large metropolitan areas. However, their legal rules are
quite different. Virginia permits fault to be considered both for divorce
and as a bar to spousal support;' Wisconsin courts do not even admit
evidence of fault. In Virginia, neither spouse has a statutory advantage in
seeking custody, although the spouse who has been the primary caretaker
19. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (1992), setting forth eleven factors the court
must consider before making a marital property allocation.
20. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1989-90) provides that the "court shall presume
that all other property is to be divided equally between the parties," although this may be
altered after consideration of twelve factors.
21. The Edgeworth Box is used to depict a simple two person bargaining situation,
where there are fixed commodities that are bargained for. FRANCIS Y. EDGEWORTH,
MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS (1881). See, e.g., JAMES FRIEDMAN, GAME THEORY WITH
APPLICATIONS TO ECONOMICS 153 (1985), for a modem description of the theory.
22. Mnookin, supra note 9.
23. Even though each case was examined in both jurisdictions, only 114 files in
Wisconsin and 98 in Virginia contained all the information we needed and resulted in final
divorces involving minor children. Statistics on bargaining involve these cases.
24. This statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1, was amended in 1988 so that only
adultery acts as a bar, and even then the judge may award alimony if not doing so would
constitute manifest injustice, based upon the respective degrees of fault during the marriage
and the relative economic circumstances of the parties.
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before separation gets custody in most cases.' In Wisconsin, there is a
presumption of joint custody.' Virginia allocates marital property based
upon several equitable factors, while Wisconsin, a state with laws
resembling a community property system, presumptively divides it evenly.
In Virginia, spousal support is often awarded on a permanent basis, while
in Wisconsin it is granted infrequently and usually only for rehabilitation of
the dependent spouse.
We collected information on the wealth of each household before
the divorce, on the shares of that wealth received by each spouse in the
final divorce decree, on the custody arrangements and visitation rights of
the non-custodial parents, and on the issues actually litigated by the spouses
in court. Using relatively simple statistical analysis, we related the shares
of custodial time and wealth received by husband and wife in the two
jurisdictions and contrasted the transaction costs expended to reach these
outcomes. We found that regardless of the legal rule, the outcomes in
terms of ultimate child custody arrangements are very similar.' In terms
of outcomes, the difference appears in the share of wealth received by the
divorcing wife or in her ability to receive long-term spousal support. ' In
terms of the use of the court system, the data reveals that, paradoxically,
the closer the legal rules approach what the parties want, the more likely
the parties are to resort to courts rather than resolve the issues through the
bargaining process." '
25. See, e.g., McCreery v. McCreery, 237 S.E.2d 167 (1977), where a husband had
been a "very nurturing parent" willing to place the welfare of the children above all else; and
Peple v. Peple, 364 S.E.2d 232 (1988) (father had become an "exceptionally attentive parent,
actively involved in the physical, mental and religious guidance of the child," while the
mother, "while a loving and fit parent, was more occupied by her employment and not able
to provide the same quality of care").
26. This statute was amended in 1988 so that the court may only award joint legal
custody if it is in the child's best interests, and either the parents agree to it, or one parent
seeks it and the judge finds that both parents are capable, and there are no conditions that
would substantially interfere with the exercise of joint legal custody. There is still a
presumption that a child is entitled to periods of physical placement (visitation) with both
parents unless it would endanger a child's physical, mental or emotional health. A number of
factors must be considered when making this determination.
27. In Wisconsin, on average, mothers received a 76.6 % share of their children's time.
In Virginia, the average was 74.8 %.
28. The total received by both spouses may be less in Virginia where so nany more
cases are litigated, at least in terms of motions practice. Unless the hours spent in
negotiation in Wisconsin exceed the total hours expended in Virginia, since time in court is
usually billed at at least the same rate, the "transaction costs" are higher in the latter state.
Whatever is spent as legal fees obviously cannot be divided between the parties.
29. There are other possible explanations for the greater litigation in Virginia. One is
that Virginians are naturally more litigious than their Wisconsin counterparts. Another is that
there is usually less litigation as the law becomes more certain. See, e.g., George Priest &
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III. THE DETERMINATE OUTCOME MODEL (WISCONSIN)
It seems natural to analyze the bargaining between the two
divorcing spouses within the framework of the Edgeworth Box diagram.
A conventional assumption in this inquiry is that the preferences of each
spouse over the wealth-custody space can be described by smooth convex
downward-sloping utility indifference curves." As we shall see later,
however, such an assumption leads to conclusions which are not supported
by the data.
If either of the spouses decides to litigate, then the court will
determine the details of the divorce agreement. In other words, no
bargaining between the spouses has to take place in order for them to
obtain the court-
determined
outcome. In this
sense, the
outcome of the HusbarA
litigation proves Sham of
an endowment Prtporty
or beginning
point for the 50E SD.
bargaining
process (see
Figure 1 and
Point E).31  Let
us assume that Wustoa
each of the
spouses is aware Figure 1
of the likely The Edgeworth Box, with endowment point in
outcome of Wisconsin
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 LEo. STUD. 1 (1984); Donald
Wittmali, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of
Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEO. STUD. 313 (1988). However,
because of the atypical indifference curves (or preferences) we find for husbands and wives
concerning custodial shares and marital property, we are inclined to believe that our
explanation is correct.
30. Here, an indifference curve is the collection of combinations of custody or wealth
that makes the spouse equally happy. In other words, the spouse is indifferent as to which of
the combinations actually occurs.
31. This is comparable to the analysis of Cooter, et al., supra note 3 (Trial Outcome).
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litigation.3' If the spouses are rational, they will never settle for less than
this endowment point. Unless the endowment point lies on the contract
curve,'a both spouses can be made better off as a result of bargaining.
Given the endowment point, the data on the actual divorce agreements
achieved without litigation can provide us with some interesting
information on the preferences of the spouses.
In Wisconsin, because of the presumption of joint custody and the
presumption of even allocation of marital property, each spouse can
normally obtain a 50150 split of custody and property without entering into
pre-divorce bargaining with the other spouse. In the context of an
Edgeworth Box diagram this implies that the endowment point is located
exactly in the center of the box. Presumably, the observed outcomes are
at the core of the bargaining game between the husband and the wife. In
other words, neither party will end up worse off than with the court-
determined outcome.34  If our assumption about smooth, convex and
downward-
sloping utility
indifference
curves is of Huttsb
correct, this core PniperrU
(and the
outcomes of the
divorce agree- *
ments) must lie
in the southeast
comer of the
Edgeworth Box Wife Shamr of
(see Figure 2).
According to the I
Wisconsin data, Figure 2
however, a wife The Edgeworth Box after Bargaining in
receives on Wisconsin
average a 76.6%
32. Cootcr, et al., supra note 3, say the spouses will be aware, because if their lawyers
made unrealistic predictions about one case, they would adjust in a Bayesian method once
confronted with the solution that was unexpected.
33. The contract curve consists of the collection of points where each party's exchange
rate of money/child custody is equal.
34. Of course there are costs involved with litigation that must be taken into account.
These are considered later in this paper. Since so few cases are litigated in the state, almost
the entire marital estate remains to be divided between the parties. Melli, et al., supra note
8, report that the Wisconsin couples they studied spent about one-fifth as much on legal fees
if they mediated as opposed to pursuing an adversary divorce.
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share of the custody while maintaining 50% of the marital property.3'
It is instructive to look beyond the averages and analyze the
outcomes broken down by custody arrangement. The bulk of the
individual outcomes is split between two types of custody. In the first
group, consisting of 17 cases, the wife's share of custody equals 50% (the
joint custody solution). In the second group (74 cases), the wife's custody
share is approximately 90% (the sole custody plus visitation solution).
Contrary to the implication of the usual assumption on preferences, the
median shares of marital property received by the wives do not differ
significantly between the two groups. In fact, the wives' median share of
marital property is somewhat greater in the second group (see Table I).
These results suggest that the spouses' preferences over custody
and marital property allocations are more complex than were previously
assumed. Consider first the preferences of a non-custodial parent (usually
an ex-husband in the cases we examined). The utility he derives from
visiting his children depends not only on the time he is allowed to spend
with them, but also on the "quality" of the children.36 This quality is,
presumably, positively related to the quality of their living conditions at
the ex-wife's home. These living conditions depend to some extent on the
share of marital property received by the wife. The husband's desire to
spend time with the children is affected also by his opportunity cost of
time. The net outcome of all these interdependencies may be such that his
ideal divorce arrangement assigns high shares both of the custody and of
marital property to the wife.37 The data suggest that, if anything, the
husbands are often willing to accept both reduced time with their children
and a lower share of marital property than would have been awarded to
them had they gone to trial.
In the context of our Edgeworth Box diagram where the
endowment point is certain, this sort of outcome implies that the husbands'
indifference curves are positively sloped in the relevant range of the
35. The marital property figure is a mean; the median figure from our data is 48%. The
comparable figure from our data in Virginia is 45 % (see Tables I and H, infra pp. 293-94).
36. The theoretical basis for this assumption can be found in GARY BECKER, TREATISE
ON THE FAMILY (1981); Gary Becker & Gregg Lewis, On the Interaction Between the
Quantity and Quality of Children, J. POL. ECON. § 279 (1985); and Douglas Allen, Wat
Does She See in Him? The Effect of Sharing on Choice of Spouse, 30 INQ. 57 (1992).
37. Of course, this is not always the case, particularly when the spouses do not maintain
an amicable relationship. They are more likely to remain on good terms, however, if they do
not litigate the divorce, according to Melli, et al., supra note 8.
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custody-marital property share space.' Whatever the slopes of the
spouses' indifference curves,' some bargaining does take place. Only by
accident would the spouses' ideal points within the Edgeworth Box
coincide. The fact that most actual outcomes of bargaining in Wisconsin
lie quite far away from the endowment point suggests that both spouses
would much prefer to avoid the court-ordered division of child custody and
property. The prospect of court-ordered settlement provides strong
incentives for negotiations outside of the courtroom. 39  Given the
determinant nature of the court outcome in Wisconsin, the divergence
between the endowment and the ideal outcomes from the spouses' point of
view is likely to result in relatively few cases of divorce litigation, and
thus a reduction in the transaction costs of divorce. This divergence,
however, may force one of the spouses to accept an inferior bargaining
outcome compared with the situation where the endowment is less "gender
neutral."
IV. INDETERMINATE OUTCOME:
THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY OF LITIGATION OUTCOME
ON PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS
The litigation outcome is much less predictable in Virginia than it
is in Wisconsin because of the presence of fault grounds for divorce, the
effect of fault on alimony, and the use of equitable factors in determining
the percentage of property that each spouse will receive. It is also possible
that the custody issue' itself is indeterminate, as the statute suggests, but,
practically speaking, courts have awarded primary custody to the wife in
all but a negligible number of cases.' Due to the higher uncertainty of
the outcomes of litigation in Virginia, the Edgeworth Box description
oversimplifies the true situation. In order to explain the outcomes of
voluntary negotiations in Virginia, we must therefore model the risk
associated with litigation.41
38. As mentioned previously, this violates the standard assumption of negatively sloped
indifference curves. Restated, husbands may be willing to give up less property after a
certain point in order to get more time with their children. This empirical result seems to
hold in both states we examined.
39. Of course, the large distance between the endowment and the equilibrium points
does not have to imply a significant difference in the corresponding values of the utility
functions. Since the spouses can accurately predict what the court would award, there is no
good reason for them to expend additional resources to litigate. See supra note 29.
40. GERALD SILvER & MYRNA SILVER, WEEKEND FATHERS 54 (1981).
41. Cooter, et al., supra note 3, at 229-31, do this for the problem of deciding whether
to negotiate or to go to trial, assuming there is only one good rather than two.
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Note that while a typical outcome of litigation in Virginia is
favorable to a wife (unlike in Wisconsin, where she would end up with far
less custody than most women seem to want),4' the "downside risk" of
litigation for a Virginia wife is relatively high.' On the other hand, the
occurrence of a litigation outcome which is significantly better than the
typical non-litigation outcome for a wife is extremely unlikely in Virginia.
Of course, the wife's share of child custody may be increased from the
high percentage the court would usually award her, but normally wives
would want to assure some participation of their former husbands in the
upbringing of the child. This may be because the wives feel participation
is better for the child. It may also be for the less child-centered reason
that the wives want some time for themselves: to get tasks done that
cannot be completed with children around, recreate, pursue hobbies,
enhance their earnings capability, or begin new relationships.' The
corollary of this is that the husband may not experience a "downside risk"
that deviates substantially from his expected court outcome, since the
probability of catastrophic financial loss or no visitation with the child is
very low. 4'
The above discussion' provides another theoretical explanation,
this time based on the asymmetrical nature of the preferences involved, of
why Virginia wives may be willing to settle for less of both custody and
42. We assume for convenience that wives put a gr'eater weight on custody than do their
husbands. This is not necessarily true (although it does seem to be borne out by our
empirical study), but is certainly suggested by the substantial feminist literature suggesting
that women value the altruistic and nurturing necessary for childrearing to a greater extent
than do men. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 7, at 886; CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 24-63 (1982); NANCY
CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1986); Christine Littleton, Reconstructing
Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1285 (1987); Alice Rossi, A Biosocial Perspective
on Parenting, 106 DAEDALUS 1, 25 (1977).
43. John Murray, Understanding Competing Theories of Negotiation, 1978
NEGOTIATION J. 179, 184 (1986).
44. Elster, supra note 2, at 4; David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for
Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 557 (1984). In terms of the
mathematical model discussed in the Appendix, on the margin there may be a relatively high
opportunity cost of time for high values of 1-t.
45. No visitation would occur only if he was shown to be unfit. See, e.g., Kern v.
Lindsey, 30 S.E.2d 707 (1944)(visitation continued although father for some years paid little
attention to his son); Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799 (1981)(otherwise fit mother allowed to
keep visiting child although she was involved in live-in lesbian relationship).
46. At this point the interested reader may wish to refer to the Section I of the
Mathematical Appendix for the description of bargaining in Wisconsin; infra, p. 295-97.
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property47 than they might typically be awarded if they chose to litigate.
There are less rigorous alternatives that provide the same result. One
possibility is that women and their attorneys may not have known what
Virginia courts were granting women in the first few years the equitable
distribution rule was applied.' However, it is not very likely that
attorneys specializing in domestic relations or those with well-to-do clients
would be ignorant of the published appellate decisions or of those from the
various circuit courts in northern Virginia. Nor did they probably feel that
this information would be so unimportant to their clients that they would
not disclose it. As a group, it is unlikely that lawyers would prefer to
generate increased fees through the more costly litigation process, both
because of ethical considerations and the importance of reputation
(goodwill) for the health of their practice. On the other hand, it is
possible that the women misunderstood their attorneys,49 or that they
misperceived the variance (or spread) of the litigated outcomes, so that
their subjective probability of loss was higher than the actual
probability. 0
A second group of explanations relates to the curvature of
husbands' and wives' utility functions. One such explanation, favored by
several legal writers, is that women as a group are more risk averse than
their husbands."1 This explanation may be true, but would be difficult to
47. Virginia women on average settled for 74.8% of the custodial time and about 45%
of the property. The difference between the average of the wife's share of marital property
in Wisconsin and in Virginia is statistically significant at a 3 % level.
48. Murray, supra note 8, at 589.
49. Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONT. PROB. 225, 253 (1983), suggests that this is not impossible,
given the indeterminate nature of child custody decisions. His suppositions are
complemented, to some extent, by the verbal findings of Austin Sarat & William Felstiner,
Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J.
1663 (1989). These authors indicate that while clients may understand their attorneys, they
may be urged toward settlement because of a distrust in the validity of the legal proceedings.
In Sarat and Felstiner's view, clients are introduced to a chaotic "anti-system" in which they
cannot rely on the technical proficiency or good faith of judges and rival lawyers and which
they have no hope of understanding on their own, Id. at 1665, 1669 n.39.
50. Mnookin, supra note 9, at 1026.
51. Risk aversion refers to the ratio of the second derivative of the utility function to its
first derivative, and has to do with willingness to settle for less than the expected utility of a
gamble in order to avoid the chance of a bad outcome. Milton Friedman & L.R. Savage,
The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 249 (1948). Risk aversion
on the part of wives is assumed by Mnookin, supra note 9, at 1025; Melli, et al., supra note
8, at 1154; and Elizabeth Scott, supra note 15. One of the authors explores the question of
whether women are more risk averse than men in Margaret Brinig & Steven Crafton, Risk
and Gender, Working Paper, George Mason University Law and EconomicsCenter, 1992.
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prove. What we feel is more likely, given our data, is that there is a
difference in men and women's preferences involving child custody.'
To lose custody of a child, even if there is only a small chance of such
loss, may represent such a catastrophic loss that women are unwilling,
even if they are risk neutral, to take the gamble.5
V. THE EFFECT OF RULES ON LITIGATION STRATEGIES
One interesting question posed by our research is what type of
legal rules might cause couples to prefer to settle their differences through
negotiation rather than litigation. The immediate reaction might be that if
the legal system provided alternatives (or "distortions," as one attorney
called them)' that the parties found acceptable, they would be inclined to
settle rather than to waste time through litigation that would be costly and
eventually end up with nearly the same result. This, however, is the
opposite of what our data revealed.
We think the reason for this apparent paradox is that the threat of
litigation becomes credible only if the predicted legal result closely
approximates what the parties really want. A father in Virginia, for
example, can threaten a custody battle by asking for it in divorce pleadings
or by filing motions even though he doesn't truly want custody and even
though he probably wouldn't get more than generous visitation if he went
to court.' This was the result in some cases where the wife eventually
received primary custody, but only a token alimony and less than half the
property. If the wife very much wants custody, she may be inclined to
settle for less in terms of child or spousal support to avoid the significant
financial and other court costs as well as the small possibility of losing
substantial time with the children" (see Table I). The Wisconsin father
does not want to go to court because he actually does not want equal
custody with his wife, which is what the law presumes is in the best
interests of the children. If his wife knows this, his threats of litigation
are not credible. The wife does not threaten litigation because, although
the judge might well award her an equal share of the marital resources,
52. CHODOROW, supra note 42, at 205-09; Chambers, supra note 44, at 533-37.
53. Elster suggests that this may be because of bonding, social pressures and so forth.
Elster, supra note 2, at 2. See also Chambers, supra note 44, at 516; Cochran, supra note 15
at n.12.
54. Murray, supra note 8, at 589.
55. This is because he would be getting close to what he wanted if the court did order
visitation. Chambers, supra note 44, at 568.
56. Cochran, supra note 15, at nn.8-86.
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she would probably also get less than primary custody of the children.
A more generalized prediction, then, would be that if the parties'
endowment points (anticipated results of litigation) closely approximate
their utility functions, there should be frequent resorts to the court system
and relatively high transaction costs in reaching settlement outcomes.
These high transaction costs may continue after the final decree. 7  The
additional friction between the parties may result in an unwillingness to
meet the agreed upon conditions of facilitating visitation or paying child or
spousal support.
Conversely, if the endowment point (or anticipated judicial
outcome) bears very little relationship to what the parties really want, they
are more likely to be forced to resolve their disputes themselves. They
are, in effect, cast upon their own resources, because the threat of
litigation is not credible. There should be lower'transaction costs in such
states both before and after trial. (To the extent, however, that divorced
women with primary custody are actually impoverished, there will be
increased public costs in the form of public assistance and other social
services.)"a
Since the Wisconsin endowment point lies further from the
negotiated outcome than does the endowment point in Virginia, based on
the above, one would expect to observe divorce cases litigated more often
in Virginia. Our data support this conclusion (see Table II). Only 5% of
the cases in our Wisconsin subsample versus 20% for Virginia went to
trial. In addition, as we noted in the introduction, some motions filed
during the preliminary proceedings can serve as threats of taking the case
to litigation.5 Such threats would be much more credible in situations
where the difference between the negotiated outcomes and the endowments
are relatively minor. We would expect the threats of litigation to be more
credible in Virginia and, therefore, to see more pre-trial motions filed in
Virginia than in Wisconsin. Again our data support this conjecture.
57. See Chambers, supra note 44, at 569. Until 1988, Virginia had one of the worst
child support collection records in the nation. The 10 Most Wanted. . .Fathers,
WASHINGTON POST, August 28, 1989, (Opinion Editorial) at A12, the editor states that in
1986, Virginia collected less child support per family than every state in the union except
Oklahoma. However, the editor also states that by 1989, Virginia ranked 16th nationally.
58. LENORE WEITrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 15-41, 339 (1985); Mary
O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault, A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 437, 440-41 (1988).
59. An alternative explanation is that the parties will litigate even over minor issues if
the anticipated court outcome will be acceptable in any case and if the various gains (psychic,
custodial, or financial) outweigh the costs (time, attorneys' and court fees and emotional).
This outcome is likely only in states where, like Virginia, the expected court outcome is
relatively close to the parties' desires.
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Pre-trial motions were filed in 20% of our cases in Virginia, compared
with only.5.5% of the cases in Wisconsin.
The argument could be made that the greater uncertainty in
Virginia might itself lead to a higher incidence of litigation, since
resources would be wasted if people were to litigate a "sure thing."
However, if both parties are risk averse, it would affect the desire of both
to litigate in a negative way. Furthermore, if either or both of the parties
is certain to have a relatively unsatisfactory outcome from litigation, there
should be very few cases that go to court. This, in fact, is the case in
Wisconsin.
VI. SUMMARY
Changes in legal rules affect not only the income distributions of
parties negotiating divorce settlements, but also their transaction costs. As
the legal rules move further away from what the parties want to agree to
anyway, out of court settlement becomes more and more likely. Our
results suggest that allowing fault to have an effect on financial allocations
at divorce may not only "imprison" some women in unfortunate
situations," but may also impair their bargaining position upon divorce.
Our results show that, contrary to the accepted wisdom, tradeoffs
between custody and property may not always be present." Further, it
may not be possible to discern a downward sloping demand curve for
visitation rightS& because this is one case that violates the usual
assumption that consumption of one good is independent from consumption
of another good.
60. Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1111
(1989).
61. Bargaining is taking place, but over some range, larger shares of both custody and
property may be on the same indifference curve as smaller shares of both goods.
62. Indeed, we tried to estimate the demand curves using some sophisticated
econometric techniques and could not obtain statistically significant coefficients. In these
estimations, the price for visitation rights equals the share of marital property given to the
custodial spouse plus the amount of child support.
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Table I
Property and Alimony Shares
A. Wisconsin (without litigation; the number of cases litigated in
Wisconsin is statistically insignificant)
Wife's Custody Percentage Wife's Mean Share of Mari
Property
............................................................................
50% (joint custody) 48%
90% (sole custody) 55%
Wisconsin Overall: 50%
B. Vireinia (without litigation)
Wife's Custody Wife's Mean Share of Percent of Cases Wife
Percentage Marital Property Awarded Alimony
............................................................................
50% (joint custody) 44% 33%
90% (sole ctstody) 45% 50%
C.Virginia (with litigation)
Wife's Custody Wife's Mean Share of Percent of Cases Wife
Percentage Marital Property Awarded Alimony
............................................................................
50% (joint custody) 40% 9%
90% (sole custody) 56% 29%
Virginia Overall: 40%
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Table II
Comparative Litigation
A. Litigation Events
Event Virginia Wisconsin
......................................................................
% of cases where there 21.45% 9.27%
was any litigation
% of cases where a 18.41% 4.78%
pendente lite hearing
was held
% of cases where motions 19.76% 5.53%
were filed
% of cases which went 10.13% 5.38%
to trial
B. Issues Presented at Trial
Virginia Wisconsin
Issue of Fault 13.34% 0.29%
Issue of Support 18.07% 5.38%
Issue of Custody 13.18% 4.04%
Issue of Property 16.79% 4.78%
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Mathematical Appendix
I. THE DETERMINATE OUTCOME MODEL: WISCONSIN
For those interested in mathematical modelling, the husband's utility
function may be represented as follows:
U = U(F,t,q)
where t is the husband's share of custody, q is the "quality" of the
children, and F stands for consumption of all other goods.' All first
partials of U are assumed to be positive. Denoting the shares of marital
property received through the divorce agreement by the husband and the
wife by h and w respectively, and noting that the quality of children is a
function of these shares, we can write q = q(1-h) = q(w), q, = -q, < 0.
Consumption of all other goods is a function of t and h among other
things, i.e., F = F(t,h), where -F, > 0 is the husband's opportunity cost
of time spent with the children. Obviously, Fh > 0. Since both F and q
depend on t and h, the utility function can be written as V = V(t,h) =
U(F(t,h),t,q(h)). The slope of the indifference curves of V(.) in the (t,h)
space is s = -Vh/Vt. It can be easily seen that Vh = UFFh + Uqlj and Vt
= UFFt + U. If the husband's opportunity cost of time is large so that
IUFFt > U,, then V, is negative. If in addition, Iqh is small enough so
that Vh remains positive, the indifference curve has a positive slope.
Alternatively, a positively sloped indifference curve can result from V, >
0 and Vh < 0. Note that most likely the slope of the husband's
indifference curves would be negative in some range of values of t and h,
and positive for the other values of these variables. In particular, as t gets
smaller, the slope of an indifference curve is likely to become fiegative
even if it is positive for greater values of t.
The wife's preferences are likely to be somewhat less ambiguous
since, other things being equal, she presumably prefers higher shares of
marital property to lower ones. Using the same notation for all the
functions as for the husband, the wife's utility function is
U = U(F(1-t, w), 1-t, q(w)) = V(1-t,q).
Notice that the relevant variables for the wife are (1-t) and w = 1-h.
Obviously, V, > 0. Nonetheless, depending on the wife's opportunity
63. Throughout, we are denoting simplified functions representing only variables that are
endogenous to (inside) our model. Functions are denoted by parenthetical expressions, and
first partial derivatives by subscripts, with the subscripts denoting the variable of
differentiation.
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cost of time, the slope of V's indifference curves in (1-t,w) space can be
either positive or negative. Again, the most likely outcome would be to
have the indifference curve slope downward for some ranges of 1-t and w,
and to slope upward for other ranges.
II. THE INDETERMINATE OUTCOME MODEL: VIRGINIA
In what follows we will assume that the wife could either obtain a
typical outcome or end up with a considerably worse outcome. Suppose a
wife is an expected utility maximizer. Denote the outcome of the
voluntary negotiations by A, the typical outcome of litigation by E," and
the "disastrous" (from the wife's point of view) litigation outcome by
D.' Then the worst voluntary agreement the wife is willing to make
(A*) is such that
U.(A*) = pUw(E) + (1-p)Uw(D)(1)
where p is the probability of a typical court outcome E and U.(.) is the
wife's utility associated with various outcomes. Since U,(E) < UW(D), it is
evident from (1) that the lower p is, the lower U(A*) has to be. Also,
U(A*) is lower the lower U,(D) is. Therefore, as long as Uj(D) is low
enough and p is low enough, U(A*) may be considerably worse than U.(E).
Notice that this argument does not depend on the degree of curvature of the
wife's utility function." Other things being equal, the more risk averse the
wife is, the lower that Uw(A*) is. Of course, the outcome of the voluntary
negotiation does not have to be the minimum acceptable to a wife. Given that
the worst outcome of negotiation acceptable to a husband is A' and that the
utility of that outcome is 7
64. The actual endowment point was determined by reading all the reported Virginia
cases (trial and appellate) involving equitable distribution that were decided during the period
1983-1987, and noting the percentages of property received by Virginia wives. In none of
these cases involving minor children did the husband receive more than "substantial
visitation" (90% custody given to the wife). Homes were uniformly divided evenly. Women
received somewhere between 15 and 40 percent of their husband's pensions, business
property and securities.
65. See Mnookin, supra note 49.
66. See supra note 49.
67. Notice that presumably Uh(E) < Uh(D), or at least that the husband may pretend that
this is the case in order to make his threat of litigation credible. In other words, he would prefer
the outcome disastrous to his wife (he gets primary custody) to the usual court outcome of
"liberal visitation." Mnookin, supra note 9, at 1032, Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note I, at
972 & n. 15; Chambers, supra note 44, at 567; and Elster, supra note 2, at 19, suggest that there
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Uh(A') = pUh(E) + (1-p)Uh(D),(2)
the out-of-court agreement should satisfy U.(A) -> U.(A*), and Uh(A) _>
Uh(A'). Other things being equal, however, the lower U.(A*), the lower
UJ(A) would be.
maybe strategic misrepresentation of preferences here. Elster quotesJudge Richard Neely, "The
Hidden Cost of Divorce: Barter in the Court," NEW REPUBLtC, Feb. 10, 1986, at 13.

